

7-5-12

(<sup>Home-from-hospital</sup> Home from hospital  
riff  
(Munich, Robert)

K's C-II scene was exactly - no more, no less -

creaky

netless

ill-curved

imposed

clears well-mixed to a complex of motifs,  
instrumental

politic

effective

as our NATO policy

two ones to Hungary (Hunan planes...)

IRBHs to Turkey, Italy, UK (Hunan, France)

or two ones in Warsaw Pact territory

much better than SAC - about! (cf. air about?)

(two ones our avch has had to be  
triggered - <sup>in worse</sup> ~~initially~~ false alarm - in  
absence of actual shooting attack (non-ave),  
than SAC or two aircraft. Very unstable to  
non-ave attacks (un-ave-lose, protect)

though in theory (+ by SAC) could be withheld by higher  
command.



2.

Even smart leaders can make — and persist in;  
unhappily — very absurd, unrealistic, "crazy,  
absurd," premise, expectation, estimate, critical  
to policy (its feasibility, its course

RBE" What are 4 or 5 things people don't  
know about C-II ; and lessons to be drawn...

(You have to be — smart, complex, confident (knows...)  
to construct catastrophes like these

Not being able to understand motivations of  
your adversaries — or the perception of our  
policies...

Then people have to go for the Big Kicker,  
against the odds, Win Everything...

It's not

("We could never — never — be so stupid as to involve  
a country for no reason (?), with no plan for  
occupations

— find a nuclear plant in the biggest earthquake  
zone, subject to terrorism

— risk the global economy...

(also of Bent & Bridled...



2-5-12

SO - was NATO (now) the means to keep



Control of Cuban missiles: one US officer with key  
(to be threatened or overpowered or persuaded)

the + JFK never believed in missiles

Was K decision to put MRBMs in Cuba better than  
US decision to put in Turkey?

(approval of K; criticism (2d thoughts) of the  
(+ ANW + me)

But K didn't have SO alternatives

the + the VFR did - e.g. Atlas, MN, Polaris

the + repeated bluff vs. US

(esp. vs Europe not being  
enough, apparently, to date,  
in press US - a charge  
"2d-tier states - like Europe?"  
(couldn't threaten SU)

|| and threat of VA was useful for  
deterring attack - a real threat to Cuba.

the objections to deployment of forbidden didn't  
apply to Cuba - giving intelligence to "be helpful"  
of Cuba (+ acceptance of SU control, unlike France)  
+ except for (!) poss. of violent superpower response!



Was it helpful / important to the US,  
or the world

as distinct from Khrushchev, up to  
to JFK's father, RFK, the Dems -

to doing SU negotiation as "equal  
business, equal rights" - by public trade  
(or by letting markets stay)?

Khrushchev appeared to have compelled  
K to back off without making any concessions -  
been doing something US had "promised  
itself to do," and would continue to do

- Confirms a US stance for beyond its  
borders, and no such stance for SU right  
on its borders



7-4-2

the Bush mission, to see  
K & Bush: Would you really go to see us over Berlin?

((UFR=NO - or by Cuba (but slow, Turk worries)  
(Cond) (Pro. Bernstein reference; Stone?)

but what unit would be & other tasks?

Cruz?

Amund?

K did find WH (UFR)

about, Bush: see U-2

K's units were not as good as the  
ones have been -

- if UFR didn't believe Bolshakov
- (if U-2 had lost U-2 but kept flying
- IF EITHER UFR or K had meant what they  
said!

- still analysts did blunder as: MREMS

too over

wounded

K blundered:

SU units

- scheduling (SMB)
- camouflage
- no back-up: confidence is sherry
- no plan to answer too many

(ASW: consider from. every will set "rationally".  
Lesson:



invasion plans for Cuba.

(Stevenson was right (Mills, Rand agreeing)

VFR had reason to feel confident

Cost

p. 8



C-II (1) <sup>Third World</sup> Convergence of our TV empire, legions problems in former colonial (Spain, US:) states, or "little sphere" (Hull), ~~but~~ but like big <sup>little</sup> sphere VN, Indonesia, Malaysia, SVN/MVN, (Taiwan), South Korea, [Japan] then, Saudi Arabia, [Israel]; confrontation

(2) our core sphere — West Europe + Berlin (Japan?)

(Note: in first instance: ~~FOR USA~~

FU threat of US

(presumption)

us. invasion

= US NATO policy

BUT: FU threat of SU (UA) (two areas)  
 FU threat of SU (UA:) us. invasion (MRBMs)  
 FS threat of SU (MRBMs) us. US FU: <sup>FI-28s</sup> Europe  
 delegation possible



7-10-12

Were there any serious contingency plans for  
winning Cuba after Nov 1962?

PDS  
Hussey

If not - any not? Provision?

Proventis continued? (from antitank US)

Spy ship?

(Netherlands - after '62?)

Did JFK & RFK really give up on regime change? NO!

Under LBJ?

(C-I fly speak

Give up on mission?

Assass.

Revels...

Did K give up on Berlin?

Brezhnev?

What became of the control of arms fighter-bombers  
on alert?

(Were K or B confident we would not  
give arms to West Germany?

or help them do underground testing,  
like France?

Did K give up desire for arms?

Was SU sure we or K would not  
return in October/November 1968? (in Poland?)



K not crazy - more (or less) than us, whole CW present.

It was legal, logical, effective for K to  
and wishes (and the war + troops) to Cuba -  
or, as much as as was whole NATO policy  
(or more) - no more - or less - crazy

"if he could get away with it -

and 1) he almost did<sup>or did</sup>, (except for Castro)

2) if he'd played it right, he could have  
done so with big pay;

3) as it was, although it was miserable  
of him to suppose camouflage was adequate,  
or that JFK could keep secret)

he could have pulled it off (both the ones)

He played it badly, except for temporary failure

1) Miss up to Oct 22 (Mikoyan -

2) Miss until Oct 26 (via. UN) (Dale)

3) not deploying before 80% operational

4) not making two areas

5) making two in

6) with one tankers! (+ not letting!)

Believing Brignone  
7) Not coordinating w. Castro on camouflage

8) Believing JFK could keep secret 3-4 weeks

9) assuming JFK didn't know - until Oct 22

10) Delegation to Pleiger on two areas.

11) no Frank II



2-10-77

Insurance of Gold (or attack) "Option"  
"Round"

Not known:

why us war

Asymmetry of base balance

& dislike "base" to back down; (vs. me)

could base fight over us; or public trade;

give VPR as support; act as defense

(likely to be found out bluffing;  
to back down)

"Surprise" if attack carried out:

C-II

GW (new version)

begin SH killed

(if then base moves)

"GW a certainty" NO - with w/o promise over  
or unilateral disarm  
"absl."

Human co. "risk of GW vs. some s-t loss"

(or: unilateral min. det: stable)

Extended det v. brakif ("Kenny, paper")

"as if US attacked, we'll be as crazy in  
response")



"you can't (be bound) bluff (ing)"

But K was partial bluffing, am + am...

Gap;

Berlin (1948, 1958, 1960, 1961, <sup>1962</sup>~~1962~~)

C-II !

JFK: Laos '61

C-I

(VN '61) (+ requires to put in troops

C-II (not caught) (but ready to be!)

CBJ: (to VCI) readiness of mobilize

etc ~ NVN...

Defect

JFK expected to come out with a

bugged-up public track (as in VN, '65!)

(on basis of threats / bluffs).

Hopefully " " " "

only Tank units: if not strong, UK, + Berlin

risked ("small" risk) of regional or GW

(larger than be thought: TN was (more  
unwise)

(VN x M: continuity of probes: only a small  
difference between a small / 20) risk and 0.

Can risk or try to go to the ground:

if risk is tight enough, try to come enough

NO ~~NO~~ ~~EXP~~



7-10-12

JFK was ready to cancel - if necessary -  
from the start - yet prolonged crisis  
close blockade

(He should not have allowed the ASW  
(against his warnings - & McN's))

or air alert! or disposal  
(unnecessary!)

low-level missile? U-2?

He used McCona's stunt - but as a bluff, for which he (CWS) <sup>would have paid.</sup>

|| Why didn't JFK & RFK take alt. would  
work? (as I would have; McCona...)

(Private deal not enough; but why not  
alt., & stunt?)

Became R but stunt dean U-2? (!)